Public Choice Theory and Government Failure
공공선택론
A political economy perspective applying rational economic self-interest to politicians, bureaucrats, and voters to explain systematic government failures, rent-seeking, and budget-maximizing bureaucracies.
| Field | Economics · Political Science |
|---|---|
| Level of analysis | Macro · Structures & Institutions |
| Paradigm | Rational Choice Institutionalism |
| Key figures | 👤 James Buchanan (제임스 뷰캐넌) 👤 Gordon Tullock (고든 툴럭) |
| Year | 1962 |
Key Claims
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock dismantled the assumption of the benevolent state. Applying methodological individualism to politics, they revealed how concentrated special interest groups successfully lobby for targeted subsidies while dispersing costs across unorganized taxpayers (rent-seeking). Bureaucratic empire-building and electoral cycle distortions generate structural ‘government failures’, mandating explicit constitutional rules to constrain discretionary state power.
Further Reading
- Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press.
- Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224–232.
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