Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
애로의 불가능성 정리
A foundational social choice theorem proving that when voters have three or more distinct options, no collective rank-order voting system can satisfy unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship simultaneously.
| Field | Economics · Political Science |
|---|---|
| Level of analysis | Macro · Structures & Institutions |
| Paradigm | Rational Choice |
| Key figures | 👤 Kenneth Arrow (케네스 애로) |
| Year | 1951 |
Key Claims
Kenneth Arrow mathematically demonstrated that converting individual ordinal preferences into a coherent, transitivity-preserving collective social welfare order is fundamentally impossible under four minimal democratic axioms: Unrestricted Domain, Weak Pareto Efficiency, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), and Non-Dictatorship. This result fundamentally transformed theoretical welfare economics and political voting science.
Further Reading
- Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. John Wiley & Sons.
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