Merleau-Ponty's Embodied Phenomenology and Body Schema
메를로-퐁티의 신체도식과 지각의 현상학
A foundational phenomenological theory asserting the primacy of embodied perception: the lived body (*corps propre*) is not an object, but our constitutive anchor and medium of being-in-the-world.
| Field | Philosophy · Cognitive Science |
|---|---|
| Level of analysis | Micro · Individual |
| Paradigm | Phenomenology Cognitivism |
| Key figures | 👤 Maurice Merleau-Ponty (모리스 메를로-퐁티) |
| Year | 1945 |
Key Claims
Maurice Merleau-Ponty demonstrated that consciousness is originally not an ‘I think that’ (cogito), but an ‘I can’ rooted in the lived body (corps propre). Through an unreflective pre-conscious body schema, our sensorimotor intentionality dynamically grips worldly situations.
Further Reading
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Gallimard. (English: Phenomenology of Perception, 1962, Routledge).
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