Job Market Signaling Theory
신호 이론
A Nobel-winning information economics theory demonstrating how high-productivity individuals acquire costly credentials (such as higher education) to signal their unobservable quality to employers, resolving adverse selection.
| Field | Economics · Education |
|---|---|
| Level of analysis | Micro · Individual |
| Paradigm | Rational Choice Institutionalism |
| Key figures | 👤 Michael Spence (마이클 스펜스) |
| Year | 1973 |
Key Claims
Michael Spence demonstrated that in markets with asymmetrical information, observable credentials function as signals if signaling costs are negatively correlated with productive capability. High-ability workers invest in education to distinguish themselves, generating a separating equilibrium.
Further Reading
- Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374.
Related theories 3개
A foundational theoretical framework in economics addressing Information Asymmetry at the micro level of analysis.
A foundational theoretical framework in economics addressing Human Capital Theory at the micro level of analysis.
A foundational theoretical framework in education addressing Credentialism at the macro level of analysis.