Efficiency Wage Theory
효율임금 이론
A New Keynesian labor economics framework explaining that employers deliberately pay above-market-clearing wages to deter worker shirking, minimize turnover costs, and enhance workforce productivity, thereby maintaining persistent equilibrium involuntary unemployment.
| Field | Economics · Management |
|---|---|
| Level of analysis | Meso · Groups & Organizations |
| Paradigm | Rational Choice Institutionalism |
| Key figures | 👤 Janet Yellen (재닛 옐런) 👤 Joseph Stiglitz (조지프 스티글리츠) 👤 George Akerlof (조지 애컬로프) |
| Year | 1984 |
Key Claims
Carl Shapiro, Joseph Stiglitz, Janet Yellen, and George Akerlof demonstrated that under imperfect information and costly monitoring, firms offer efficiency wages above the competitive market clearing rate. Higher wages increase the cost of job loss for workers, reducing shirking and turnover while improving morale. Because all rational firms adopt this strategy, aggregate wages remain downwardly rigid, generating permanent involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium discipline device.
Further Reading
- Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. American Economic Review, 74(3), 433–444.
- Yellen, J. L. (1984). Efficiency wage models of unemployment. American Economic Review, 74(2), 200–205.
- Akerlof, G. A., & Yellen, J. L. (Eds.). (1986). Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. Cambridge University Press.
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